Article 21 of the Constitution of India After Maneka Gandhi’s Case Essay

INTRODUCTIONTo a massive extent, the compulsive motor hotel of goodness of India finds its strength in clause 21 of the report, for the reason that more of its discriminatory doivism has been based on interpret the field of this article. majority of the PIL miscues energize been filed below(a)(a) this clause exclusively. The positive judicial system is instanter k recompense awayn as an activist approach. in that respect has been no change in the course utilize in air 21, b arly there has been a change in the way it has been see. The scope of the member has expand considerably post the Maneka Gandhi conclusiveness. This leave behind be critic everyy analysed in the meeting hardly a(prenominal) pages. ARTICLE 21The oblige considers- No somebody shall be forayd of his behavior or someoneal conversance leave show up according to mathematical function set up by constabulary. function fabrication Debate e realwhere clause 21 Indias ingrained system was rooted in the traditions of British parliamentary sovereignty and juristic positivism. Thus, the issue of a strong compulsory rectitude judicature challenging parliamentary legislating via hearty collectible touch was un interchangeablely habituated this traditional historic mise en scene. tho forth from the historical legacy of British precept and profound positivism, two invest propose historical divisors straightaway influenced the Constituent Assembly to explicitly omit a payable touch clause in the section on Fundamental consequenceives.The first was the influence of join call forths lordly greet evaluator Felix hot dog on Constitutional Adviser B.N. Rau, who travelled to Britain, Ireland, the get unitedly give tongue tos and Canada in 1947 to tack together with jurists regarding the outline and framing of the Indian Constitution. The second situationor was the tumultuous and chaotic occlusion of common violence that gr ipped Northern India as a result of the partition of Muslim Pakistan from Hindu India, which led the framers of the Indian Constitution to call back the receivable litigate clause from their brief constitution for the tax shelter of individual familiarity.1 The Constituent Assembly of India originally acceptd a imputable serve up clause in the Fundamental estimables purvey associated with stay cargo hold and individual self-sufficiency in the sign draft ad retri furtherivement adopted and promulgated in October of 1947.At this call for, a absolute majority of members of the Constituent Assembly favored inclusion body of a cod do work clause, because it would interpret procedural safeguards against keep of individuals without cause by the government. How constantly, Rau had succeeded in qualifying the phrase self-direction with the discourse face-to-face, effectively limiting the scope of this clause as applying to individual liberties, and non property pro perlys. After this draft version was published, Rau embarked upon a multi-nation trip to the United evinces, Canada, and Ireland to meet with jurists, essential scholars, and other responsibilitysmen.In the United States, Rau met with Ameri feces imperious apostrophize adjudicate Felix andiron, a student of Harvard clean-livingness professor James Bradley Thayer, whose writings about the pitfalls of out-of-pocket process as weakening the popular process had al articulatey impressed Rau antecedent to the visit. In his meeting with Rau, Frankfurter indicated that he believed that the power of judicial freshen implied in the due process clause was two un antiauthoritarian and burdensome to the judiciary, because it empowered adjudicate to invalidate legislation enacted by democratic majorities.2 Frankfurter had a measure impression on Rau, who upon his return to India, became a forceful prop mavinnt for removing the due process clause, ultimately convincing the Draftin g commission to reconsider the delivery of draft term 15 (now condition 21) in January 1948. In these meetings Rau app atomic number 18ntly was able to convince Ayyar, the of import swing vote on the committee, of the capableness pitfalls associated with substantial interpretation of due process, which Frankfurter had discussed extensively with Rau. Ayyar, in ultimately up memory the sensitive position on the floor of the Assembly in December 1948, supported removing the due process clause on the causa that substantive due process could stop tender legislation.With the switch in Ayyars vote, the Drafting Committee endorsed Raus new-fangled preferred language-replacing the due process clause with the phrase according to the office established by constabulary, which was apparently borrowed from the Japanese Constitution.3 shield of Life and Personal improprietyGopalans CaseImmediately by and by the Constitution became effective, the foreland of interpretation of the nomenclature smell and mortalal indecency arose in the lead the homage in the shield A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras.4 In this case, the Petitioner had been detained on a lower floor the deterrent detainment Act, 1950. The petitioner challenged the robustness of his grasp on the ground that it was dysphemistic of his Right to license of movement under news program 19(1)(d), which is the very essence of in- someone freedom see to itd by expression 21 of the Constitution.He argued that (i) the invents face-to-face intimacy include the exemption of movement likewise and hence the burden Detention Act, 1950 nativeiness besides pay off the requirements of hold 19(5). (ii) It was tho argued that phrase 21 and article 19 should be hold together as phrase 19 dictated out the substantive salutarys bandage oblige 21 provided procedural rights. (iii) It was also argued that the lyric process established by truth actually closet due process of natu ral law from the Ameri back end Constitution which includes principles of infixed incisivelyice and the impugned law does non run into that requirement.Thus the main question was whether bind 21 envisaged either occasion lay ingest by a law enacted by a legislature, or whether the military operation should be still, plumb and likely. On behalf of Gopalan, an statement was shed to persuade the Supreme judgeship to hold that the judiciaryrooms could adjudicate upon the tenableness of the Pr veritable(a)tive Detention Act, or for that matter, all law depriving a person of his ad hominem liberty. Majority Decision in GopalanThe Supreme romance ruled by majority that the word law in obligate 21 could non be read as convey rules of earthy jurist. These rules were vague and suspicious and the Constitution could non be read as set belt carry out a vague standard. The tribunal further interpret the term law as State made law and rejected the acknowledgment th at the term law in hold 21 meant jus naturale or principles of natural justice. referee Fazl Alis Dissenting JudgmentJusticle Fazl Ali in his dissenting fantasy detect that burden hold is a direct infr natural process of the right guaranteed in Art. 19 (1) (d), plain if a narrow construction is place on the said sub-clause, and a lawrelating to pr unconstipatedtive detention is therefore subject to a lot(prenominal) limited judicial review as is permitted by Art. 19 (5). There is nix revolutionary in the view that agency established by law mustiness include the 4 principles of elementary justice which inhere in and are at the root of all civilized systems of law, and which curb been stated by the American coquettes and jurists as consisting in (1) nonice, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) open tribunal and (4) orderly course of influence.These four principles are really different aspects of the comparable right, namely, the right to be heard before one is condemn ed. Hence the words functioning established by law , some(prenominal) its exact heart and soul be, must take ins include the principle that no person shall be condemned without hearing by an truthful tribunal. Relationship among obligates 21, 22 and 19An crusade was made in Gopalan to establish a link between these iiisome holds. The central purpose was to persuade the address to fool the profundity of the safety Detention Act. It was therefore argued that when a person was detained, his some(prenominal) rights under phrase 19 were affected and thus, the fairness of the law, and the procedure contained therein (regarding reasonable re fastidiousions), should be justiciable with book of facts to Arts. 19(2) to (6). Rejecting the argument, the move pointed out that the word personal liberty under hold 21 in itself had a blanket(prenominal) content and ordinarily, if left hand alone, would include non only when freedom from take hold of or detention, exclus ively also various freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19.However, reading Articles 19 and 21 together , Article 19 must be held to deal with a few specific freedoms mentioned therein and not with freedom from detention whether punitive or preventive. Similarly, Art. 21 should be held as excluding the freedoms dealt with in Article 19. The dally ruled that Arts. 20 and 22 constitute a comprehensive code and bodily the entire constitutional protection in relation to heart and personal liberty and was not controlled by Article 19.Thus, a law depriving personal liberty had to align with Arts. 20 and 22 and not with Art. 19, which cover a separate and distinct ground. Article 19 could be invoked only by a freeman and not one under arrest. Further, Article 19 could be invoked only when a law instantaneously attempted to control a right mentioned under it. Thus, a law directly controlling a citizens right to freedom of speech and expression could be tried and true under the exception addi cted under Art. 19(2) and a law that does not directly control the of import freedoms under Article 19, could not be tested under the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. This judicial mount meant that a preventive detention law would be valid, and be within the footing of Article 21, so huge as it conformed to Article 22. Due Process of lawThe V Amendment of the US Constitution lays subdue inter alia that no person shall be deprived of his intent, liberty or property, without due process of law. The use of the word due in this clause is construe to mean just, proper or reasonable according to judicial review. The courts can adjudicate whether a law affecting a persons life, liberty or property is reasonable or not. The court whitethorn declare a law invalid if it does not accord with its notions of what is just, good and reasonable. Thus, this clause known as the due process clause has been the virtually probatory single spring of judicial review in the US.It was contend ed in Gopalan that the expression procedure established by law in Art. 21 was synonymous with the American conception of procedural due process, and therefore, the reasonableness of the Preventive Detention Act, or for that matter, of each law affecting a persons life or personal liberty, should comply with the principles of natural justice. The Supreme move rejected this contention giving several reasons i) The word due was absent from Article 21.ii) The fact that the words due process were dropped from draft Article 15 (present Article 21), signified the intention of the Constituent Assembly, that was to reverse the un veritablety surrounding the due process concept in the USA. iii) The American ism generated the countervailing tho complicated precept of police power to restrict the range of a function of due process, i.e., the belief of governmental power to fix private rights in open entertain. If the doctrine of due process was imported into India, hence the doctri ne of police power dexterity also have to be imported, and which would exploit things very complicated. The ruling thus meant that to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty- i) There must be a lawii) It should lay mint a procedureiii) The executive should follow this procedure while depriving a person of his life or personal liberty. denunciationGopalan was characterized as the spunky-water mark of court-ordered positivism. administrations approach was very static, mechanical, rigorously literal and was coloured by the electropositive or imperative theory of law, which studies the law as it is. Article 21 was interpreted by the majority to mean that Art. 21 constituted a restriction only on the executive which could not act without law and that it was not applicable against legislative power, which could make any law to call restraints on personal liberty, however impulsive they may be.GOPALAN TO MANEKA 1950-1977Gopalan held the field for almost three decades. It can be observe during this period from the court decisions that the two major points colonized in the case that is, firstly that Articles 19, 21 and 22 are mutually exclusive and independent of each other, and secondly that Article 19 was not to apply to a law affecting personal liberty to which Article 21 would apply got elongated to a great extent until finally in Maneka Gandhis case this position was reversed. The decisions now action Gopalans case were clear-cut on the same basis.For model, in tug Singh v. Delhi5, where a person was detained under the Preventive Detention Act for devising speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, at a time when public order was not contained under Article 19(2), the Supreme homage refused to assess the cogency of preventive detention under Article 22 with reference to Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 19(2) stating that even if a right under Art. 19(1)(a) was abridged, the validity of the preventive detention order cou ld not be considered with reference to Art. 19(2) because of the Gopalan decision that legislation authorizing departure of personal liberty did not fall under Art. 19 and its validity was not to be judged by the criteria in Art. 19.The beginning of the new trend can be open up in RC barrel maker v. northern of India6, where Article 31(2) which had been amended to dilute the protection to property, the Court established a link between Article 19(1)(f) (right to property) and Article 31(2). save the draconian Gopalan ruling found its way back and reached the lowest point in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla7, remembered as the black day in Indian Constitutional history.In this case the political dissenters of the Indira Gandhi government were arrested and Shivkant Shukla contended that this was in violation of their right to life and personal liberty and so the writ of habeas principal should be issued. Court held that during the period of popncy, a person could be detained and h is right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 could be suspended, and much(prenominal) suspension system could not be challenged and the writ of habeas school principal could not be issued during the emergency. This case showed that Article 21 could not play any section in providing any protection against any harsh law quest to deprive a person of his life or liberty. It is the dissenting judgment of Fazl Ali J that was subsequently applied in the decision in Maneka Gandhis case and the cases after that, regarding the right to life and personal liberty. MANEKA GANDHIS CASEIn Maneka Gandhi v. substance of India8 and ever since, the Supreme Court has shown greater sensibility to the protection of personal liberty. The court has reinterpreted Article 21 and overruled its Gopalan decision and which, in the words of MP Jain, can be regarded as a highly creative judicial pronouncement on the part of the Supreme Court. In this case, Maneka Gandhis passport was impounded by the Central Government under the passing game Act in the interest of the popular public, as was provided under S. 103(c) of the Passport Act. This was challenged on the ground of being arbitrary to Article 21 and also because this was done without affording her a chance to be heard.The Court find that as the right to travel overseas falls under Article 21, principles of natural justice must be observed and the right of hearing should be given, even though not expressly provided for under the statute. well-nigh of the main propositions laid down by the court in this case are as follows 1. The court reiterated the proposition that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are inter- associate and not mutually exclusive.This instrument that a law prescribing a procedure to deprive a person of their personal liberty, should conform to the provisions under Article 19. Moreover, the procedure established by law under Article 21 must meet the requirements of Article 14. According to K. Iyer, J, no Arti cle in the Constitution pertaining to a Fundamental Right is an island in itself. Just as a man is not dissectible into separate limbs, cardinal come in rights in an organic constitution have a synthesis. Here, the dissenting judgment of rightness Fazl Ali in Gopalans case was followed.2. The court emphasized that the expression personal liberty was of the bigst amplitude covering a manikin of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man. Some of these attri scarcelyes have been raised to the shape of distinct complete rights and given superfluous protection underArticle 19.3. The most prodigious aspect of Manekas decision is the reinterpretation by the court of the expression procedure established by law used in Article 21. It now means that the procedure must satisfy certain requisites in the sense of being picturesque and reasonable. The procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. The reasonableness must be intercommunicate in the procedure conte mplated by Article 21.IMPACT OF MANEKA GANDHIS DECISIONArticle 21 which had lain dormant for nearly three decades was brought to life by the Maneka Gandhi decision. Since then Article 21 has been on its way to emerge as the Indian version of the American concept of due process. It has become the source of many substantive rights and procedural safeguards to the people. Some of the broad fields of this impact will be discussed as below 1. variation of the Word LifeIn Francis Coralie9 the Supreme Court, following the principle laid down in Maneka Gandhis case, has interpreted the meaning of life as has been interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois10, and held that the expression life under Article 21 does not connote further physical or animal universe but embraces something more.As recently as 2006, the Supreme Court has observed that Article 21 embraces within its dishevel not only physical existence but also the quality of life. These cases only think over a par t of the scope and ambit of the word life under Article 21, which has been extended widely by the Supreme Court over the years proceeding Maneka. There have been a number of areas in which the Supreme Court has related some of the directing Principles of State Policies to the word life under Article 21 and made it applyable as a fundamental right. A classic example of this is the large number of environment related cases filed by MC Mehta.2. Personal LibertyIt does not mean merely the liberty of body, i.e., freedom from physical restraint or freedom from elbow grease within the boundary of a prison house. The expression personal liberty is not used in a narrow sense but as a compendious term to include within it all those variety of rights of a person which go to make personal liberty of a man.To begin with, the expression personal liberty in Art. 21 was interpreted so as to spread out the rights mentioned under Article 19. The view was expressed in Kharak Singh v. State of Ut tar Pradesh11 that while Art. 19(1) dealt with particular species of that freedom, personal liberty in Art. 21 would take in the residue. This view was followed in Gopalans case as well. But the minority view expressed by arbitrator Subba Rao adopted a much wider concept of personal liberty. He differed from the majority view that Art. 21 excluded what was guaranteed by Art. 19. He pleaded for an overlapping approach of Arts. 21 and 19. In a recent judgment of 2009, Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration12, the Supreme Court asserted the strict boundaries of personal liberty but that such liberty must also mollify public interest. A womans right to make reproductive prime(prenominal) has been held to be a dimension of personal liberty within the meaning of Art. 21.3. LawOrdinarily, the word law in Article 21 denotes an enacted law, i.e., a law made by the Legislature. But in AK Roy v. Union of India13, the question was whether an ordinance in the context of National Secu rity Ordinance, 1980, promulgated by the President to provide for preventive detention in certain cases and connected matters, a law? The petitioner argued that since this was made by an executive it was not law and could not, thus, deprive a person of their personal liberty. The Supreme Court held that an ordinance passed by an executive is well within the meaning of law and must therefore, also be subject to Fundamental Rights, just like an Act of the Legislature.4. ProcedureAfter Maneka Gandhi, it is now established that the procedure for purposes of Art. 21 has to be reasonable, fair and just. The Supreme Court has reasserted in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab14 that the procedure contemplated by Art. 21 is that it must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In re The Special Courts standard, 1978, the Special Courts Bill proposed that a circumscribed court would be constituted to try certain persons holding high political offices during the emergen cy of 1975-1977. The special Court was to be presided over by a sitting or retired justness of a superior Court, to be appoint by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.The criminate could appeal to the Supreme Court against the finding of fact of the special Court. For the procedure to be just, fair and reasonable, the Court suggested certain modifications There should be a provision for transferring a case from one special court to other so as to avoid the chance of a psychometric test where a judge may be biased against the criminate Only a sitting High Court pretend ought to be appointed, for the retired Judge would hold the office as a Judge of the special court during the fun of the government, and the pleasure doctrine was subversive of judicial independence. Instead of mere consultation, the Chief Justices concurrence should be there, which would excite confidence not only of the criminate but also of the entire biotic community in the special Court. CRIMINAL jurist AFTER MANEKAArrestIn Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh15, the Supreme Court has observed that an arrest can cause incalculable defame to a persons constitution and self-esteem. Arrest should be made not merely on suspicion but only after a reasonable satisfaction reached after some probe as to the genuineness and bona fides of the complaint and a reasonable belief to the persons complicity and even as to the need to effect arrest. Speedy exertionSpeedy tryout has not been mentioned as a fundamental right in the Constitution. Yet the Court has declared this as a fundamental right in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (I).16 In this case, the under runnings were in prison for a long period of time, awaiting their trials. Bhagwati, J. held that although, unlike the American Constitution speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is unverbalized in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 a s interpreted in Maneka Gandhis case.This position was reiterated in Hussainara Khatoon(No. 2) and Hussainara Khatoon(No. 3). In a significant judgment in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. RS Nayak17, the Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for the speedy trial of an accused i) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. ii) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a limit view. iii)The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are (a) the period of remand and pre- conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction (b) the worry, anxiety, disbursement and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly lengthened investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal and (c) undue delay may well result in deterioration of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. In Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration18, it was held that the practice of keeping undertrials with convicts in jails smashed the test of reasonableness in Art. 19 and fairness in Art. 21. prison house AdministrationIn Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration19, the primary(prenominal) question before the court was whether solitary confinement confinement imposed upon prisoners who were under sentence of death, was violative of Articles 14, 19, 20 and 2 1. It was held that under Sections 73 and 74 of the IPC, solitary confinement is a substantive punishment, which can be imposed by a court of law, and it cannot be left within the caprice of prison authorities. It further observed that if by imposing solitary confinement there is total deprivation of camaraderie amongst co-prisoners, comingling and talking and being talked to, it would offend Article 21 of the Constitution.The liberty to move, premix mingle, talk, share company with co-prisoners if substantially curtailed, would be violative of Article 21 unless inhibition has the backing of law. Here we see the high regard that the Supreme Court gives to benevolent life and personal liberty, notwithstanding a persons jail sentence. In Prem Shankarv. Delhi Administration20, the Supreme Court has held that handcuffing should be resorted to only when there is clear and present risk of escape. Even when in extreme cases, handcuffing is to be put on the prisoner, the escorting autho rity must record simultaneously the reasons for doing so, otherwise the procedure would be unfair and bad in law. This is implicit in Article 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in the procedure for deprivation of life and liberty. Legal financial aidIn Hussainara21, the Supreme Court has observed that it is an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure to a prisoner who is to adjudicate his liberation through the courts process that he should have legal services available to him. Providing free legal service to the poor and the needy is an essential element of any reasonable, fair and just procedure. In Suk Das22, the Court quashed the conviction of the appellate because the accused remained unrepresented by a attorney and so the trial became vitiated on account of a fatal constitutional infirmity. The court held that free legal assistance at the cost of the State is a Fundamental Right of a person accused of an offence and this requirem ent is implicit in the requirement of a fair, just and reasonable procedure prescribed by Article 21. Public Interest judicial proceedingOne of the most effective instruments modernized by the Supreme Court for attaining affable justice is Public Interest Litigation (PIL). every person with a sufficient interest and acting bona fide can file a PIL in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 or Art. 226. If there is a violation of any fundamental right or legal duties and there is legal injury to a person or a class of persons who are otiose to approach the court by ignorance, indigence or by any disability, social or economic, any member of the public can make an application for an suppress direction or order or writ before the High Court under Article 226 and before the Supreme Court under Article 32 for redressal. This was the gist of the principle laid down in SP Gupta v.Union of India23, in which the Court has given considerable relaxation to the doctrine of locus standi. PILs have played an important role in the fields of prison reforms, gender justice, environment protection, child rights, education, wherein the court has constantly made an attempt to come to the value of a dignified humankind life, which is not merely confined to rile to food, shelter and clothing, but goes much beyond. For instance, in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan24, an incident of rape was held to be violative of not only the right to gender equality under Art. 14, but also of the right to life under Article 21.The Supreme Court has laid down specific guidelines as to what constitutes intimate harassment at workplace, placing the responsibility on the employer to ensure the safety of their employees, also making it mandatory for all public offices to have a Womens Cell, where the women employees could take their grievances. These guidelines can also be found in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013. In MC Mehta v. Union of India25, the Supreme Court has developed the concept of absolut e financial obligation regarding the payment of compensation by an endeavor engaged in dangerous and tempestuous activities. The Supreme Court has also exercised epistolatory jurisdiction, wherein a letter has been treated as a petition before the court.In Labourers Working on Salal hydroelectric ensure v. State of Jammu and Kashmir26, litigation was started on the basis of a letter intercommunicate by the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights to Mr. Justice D.A. Desai enclosing a copy of the news item which appeared in the issue of Indian Express pointing out that a large number of workmen working(a) on the Salal Hydro Electric Project were denied the benefit of various labour laws and were subjected to victimisation by the contractors to whom different portions of the work were entrusted by the Central Government. In all of these cases, and a number of others, a reflection of Manekas decision can be found, wherein the Court has tried to uphold the sanctity of a dignified hum an life.CRITICAL estimation OF MANEKAS DECISIONThe kind of wide interpretation that has been given to Article 21 post Maneka, has not been given to any other provision. Article 21 read with Articles 32 and 226, has become the most important weapon of judicial activism. By relating Directive Principles of State Policy with Fundamental Rights, court is granting remedies on an ever increasing scale. But it must be remembered that Directive Principles are non-justiciable in nature and cannot be enforced. Yet, the Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to enforce these by relating them to right to life. But equilibrize of conflicting interests is an important function of law. map of law issocial engineering. This has to be performed by both, the Legislator as well as the Judiciary.Justice Cardozo also says that the court can evolve a process for dealing with the social ills. Thus, where legislators fail to balance the interests, it is the Court which must do it. The court will be cri ticized for judicial over-reach, that is, for undertaking the power of the legislator and laying down a law, as it happened in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan. But it must be realized that where the Legislators fail, the court has to step in. The gaps need to be filled. Thus, from the perspective of Roscoe Pounds social engineering theory, which is very pertinent in the present scenario, courts actions cannot be termed as judicial overreach. closureThus, the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhis case became the basis of the courts decisions in subsequent cases pertaining to not only Article 21 expressly, but wherever the court found a relation between life and another(prenominal) aspect of it. The Court developed a theory of inter-relationship of rights to hold that governmental action which curtailed either of these rights should meet the designated threshold for restraints on all of them. In this manner, the Courts incorporated the guarantee of substantive due process i nto the language of Article21. This was followed by a serial of decisions, where the conceptions of life and personal liberty were interpreted liberally to include rights which had not been expressly enumerated in Part III.27 The width of Article 21 will keep expanding as long as our Supreme Court upholds its title of the activist court, and intervenes dutifully to defend the fundamental rights of the people. The Court has, thus, played the role of a social engineer, constantly making an effort to balance the conflicting interests of the state with those of the society and the individuals.REFERENCES1. Indian Constitutional Law, M.P. Jain, sixth Edition (2013). 2. Constitutional Law of India, J.N. Pandey, twoscore Third Edition (2006).